Abstract-We consider the problem of collision avoidance at vehicular intersections for a set of controlled and uncontrolled vehicles that are linked by wireless communication. Each vehicle is modeled by a first order system. We use a disturbance to account for bounded model uncertainty. We construct a discrete event system abstraction and formulate the problem in the context of supervisory control for discrete event systems with uncontrollable events. This allows us to mitigate computational limitations related to the presence of continuous dynamics and infinite state spaces. For solving the resulting supervisory control problem at the discrete event level, we develop an algorithm that exploits the structure of the transition map to compute the supremal controllable sublanguage more efficiently than standard algorithms. We present implementation results on an intersection with several vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicle collisions cause, on average, 4156 injuries and 84 deaths per day in the United States [1] . About a quarter of all reported light vehicle fatalities are due to side impacts, suggesting collisions at traffic intersections and merges [2] . A side impact avoidance system at traffic intersections must deal in real time with multiple vehicles, uncontrolled vehicles, and model uncertainty.
In this paper, the collision avoidance problem is formulated in the framework of the supervisory control theory of discrete event systems [3] . The computational complexity is tamed by reducing the continuous dynamics of a multi-vehicle system to a finite representation, namely, a discrete event system (DES). This approach is commonly known as abstraction. Then, the control map is synthesized based on the set of allowed transitions of the DES. Abstraction-based control schemes were proposed in [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] for incrementally stable systems, and extended in [8] to general systems, using nondeterministic DES. In [9] , abstraction techniques for safety enforcement were discussed in the context of reachability analysis. In [10] , the problem of robot control is considered by applying an abstraction based on triangularization and designing a low-level (continuous) control to satisfy path specifications expressed in linear temporal logic (LTL). In [11] , the dynamic properties of common mechanical systems (including models of vehicle dynamics) were exploited to obtain a safetyenforcing supervisory control based on a deterministic abstraction, irrespective of the stability properties of the dynamics. An alternative solution, based on an equivalence relation between the collision avoidance problem and a scheduling problem, Del Vecchio is with the ME Dept. at MIT, MA, USA ddv@mit.edu is discussed in [12] . These results are, however, limited to the case of perfectly known models, and do not address the presence of uncontrolled agents. A different approach to the collision avoidance problem is proposed in [13] , based on a centralized scheduling of the intersection crossing times of all vehicles. We directly exploit the simple structure of first order vehicle dynamics with model uncertainty to construct a finite deterministic DES abstraction. In contrast to [11] , our results deal with model uncertainty and handle the presence of uncontrolled vehicles. In particular, we introduce a deterministic DES that simulates the original continuous system, and such that the continuous system alternatingly simulates the DES (see, e.g., [5] for the definitions of similarity and alternating similarity). The actions of uncontrolled vehicles are modeled naturally as uncontrollable events. Modeling uncertainty is handled by adding suitable uncontrollable transitions to the DES model. We prove that safety at the continuous level is implied by a notion of safety at the discrete event level. We then pose the desired collision avoidance problem in the framework of the theory of supervisory control of DES [3] . The problem has three requirements: (R1) safety, i.e., vehicular collisions must be avoided; (R2) non-blockingness, i.e., vehicles should not deadlock and must reach their final destinations, which in this case means they must completely cross the intersection; and (R3) maximal permissiveness, i.e., the supervisory control actions should leave as much autonomy as possible to the individual vehicles. In the presence of uncontrollable events, the solution is obtained by computing the supremal controllable sublanguage [14] of the specification language with respect to the system language and the set of uncontrollable events.
The resulting supervisory control problem to solve at the discrete event level is the well-known "Basic Supervisory Control Problem -Nonblocking case", or BSCP-NB [15] . Its solution provably satisfies requirements (R1)-(R3). Instead of using standard techniques for computing the supremal controllable sublanguage, the key step in solving BSCP-NB, we develop new algorithmic techniques that are customized to the specific application under consideration and thereby achieve greater computational efficiency. Our approach has conceptual similarities with the "variable lookahead" technique of [16] but differs in two respects. First, we do not do limited lookahead but we perform a depth-first search over the entire state space. This is required as eventually, we want to find the optimal control action from every (safe) state in the state space. Second, in our approach, we deal with the uncontrollability resulting from unmodeled dynamics and uncontrolled vehicles; specifically, we exploit structural properties of the transition structure of the underlying automaton obtained from the abstraction step. We present implementation results that illustrate the computational efficiency of our approach. Finally, we note that the approach that we follow has the advantage of leaving complete freedom to the driver over the timing of the intersection crossing, thus reducing the control action to the minimum required to enforce safety; this follows from the maximalpermissiveness of the supremal controllable sublanguage.
The simulation-alternating simulation structure that we exploit to construct our abstraction is analogous to the one obtained in [8] . Our results, however, apply to systems with model uncertainty. Furthermore, our focus here is on determining the largest subset of transitions of the DES that preserves requirements (R1) and (R2), something that is not addressed in [8] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the continuous model and define the problems we will solve. In Section III, we construct the DES abstraction. Section IV presents our customized algorithm for computing the supervisory controller at the discrete event level. Performance results from an implementation of this algorithm are presented in Section V, while Section VI concludes the paper. Due to space limitations, several proofs are not presented here; they are available from the authors.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

Notation:
In the text, the symbol · denotes the infinity norm of a vector, a subscripted index (e.g., x i ) indicates an element of a vector, and a superscripted index (e.g., x i ) indicates a vector out of a set of vectors. The symbols t and t denote the greatest integer less than or equal to t and the smallest integer greater than or equal to t, respectively.
Consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of vehicles, where n = |N |, moving along p roads, p ≤ n, that intersect at a unique point. The vehicles are modeled as single integrators and their collective dynamics are described by the systeṁ
where x ∈ X ⊂ R n is the state, with X compact, v ∈ V ⊂ R n is the control input, and d ∈ D ⊂ R n is a disturbance input representing unmodeled dynamics. Assume that v ∈ V is a vector with elements in the finite set {µa, µ(a + 1), . . . , µb}, with a, b ∈ N and µ ∈ R + , and that
n . We refer to aµ and bµ as v min and v max , respectively. We allow the possibility that a subset of the vehicles cannot be controlled. To represent this, we partition the vector v into two subvectors, v c ∈ V c and v uc ∈ V uc , where v c represents the control inputs of the controlled vehicles, whereas v uc represents the control inputs of the uncontrollable vehicles, such that v = (v c , v uc ) and V = V c × V uc . Assume also that v min + d min ≥ µ, so that µ constitutes a lower bound on the velocity of the vehicles. Finally, assume that the input v is kept constant over time intervals [kτ, (k + 1)τ ], and discretize the above system in time, with step τ , obtaining
Calling U = V τ and ∆ = Dτ , we have that u ∈ U and δ ∈ ∆. As for the set V , we write U = U c × U uc , where U c is the set of available actions for the controllable vehicles and U uc is the set of actions of the uncontrollable vehicles. We use the notation u = (u c , u uc ) to denote the actions of the controllable and uncontrollable vehicles for any vector u ∈ U .
Define a grid with hypercubic cells of side τ µ covering X, and consider a regular latticeQ of step τ µ such that an element q of the lattice lies in the centre of each hypercubic cell. Since both q ∈Q and x ∈ X are elements of R n , the infinity norm defines a distance for any pair (q, x). Take the function (x) := min
where min is taken in the lexicographical order. Assume that the latticeQ is such that, for all q ∈Q, there exists an x ∈ X such that (x) = q. Let W be a set of symbols with cardinality
n . Now, for each pair (q, u), define the set of reachable states
and given a subset W q,u of W with the cardinality of Q q,u , define a bijective assignment
Finally, define the DES
with state setQ, events set U × W , and transition function ψ(q, u, w) defined as follows:
ψ(q, u, w) = q iff w ∈ W q,u , and w
Hereafter, we write q / ∈Q whenever, for all x such that (x) = q, all vehicles have crossed the intersection in state x. The set Q 0 is the initial state set, assumed hereafter to be any subset ofQ. In the construction above, a transition is described by a pair of events, u and w. Events u of the DES are in one to one relation with the possible control inputs of the continuous system, whereas events w account for the difference between the expected reached state and the state that is effectively reached, due to the effect of the disturbance input. We denote by L(G, q) the language of G starting from state q, that is, the set of all possible strings of events u 1 w 1 u 2 w 2 ... that can occur starting from initial state q ∈ Q 0 . The symbol s is used to denote a generic string. Also, given a state q ∈Q, we denote by (q, u, w) a transition of (4) from state q with event u, w, and by (q, s) an execution of (4) starting from initial state q, with events string s = u 1 w 1 u 2 w 2 .... We write ψ(q, s) to denote the last state reached by an execution. Since each vector u is itself composed of a subvector of controllable inputs u c and a subvector of uncontrollable inputs u uc , a string of events s can also be a sequence of the form s = u Definition II.1. We say thatG simulates (2) if (i) for all x ∈ X there exists a q ∈Q such that q = (x), (ii) for all x ∈ X and q ∈Q such that q = (x),
Definition II.2. We say that (2) alternatingly simulatesG if (i) for all q ∈Q there exists an x ∈ X such that q = (x), (ii) for all x ∈ X and q ∈Q such that q = (x),
Ignoring the fact the state spaces of (2) andG are different, the intuition behind alternating similarity is that, for any control decision u 1 c of systemG, there exists a control decision u 2 c of system (2) such that the set of reachable states in the latter case is contained in the set of reachable states in the former case. This is useful for a safety objective where the goal is to avoid a set of states. In such a case, the safety of u 1 c in systemG implies the safety of u 2 c in system (2). Given the above construction and the definitions of similarity and alternating similarity, we can prove the following.
Lemma II.1.G simulates (2) and (2) alternatingly simulates G.
Proof: (G simulates (2)): In Definition II.1, (i) is true because the grid defining the latticeQ covers X; (ii) follows from the definition of the observation maps; (iii) is a consequence of the definition of transitions in (5) by taking u 1 = u 2 . ((2) alternatingly simulatesG): In Definition II.2, (i) is true by assumption; (ii) follows from the definition of the observation maps; (iii) follows by taking u 1 = u 2 = u and w = q − q − u, which is guaranteed to exist by virtue of the transition structure of equation (5).
Define a set Π k for each road, and say that vehicle i ∈ Π k if vehicle i drives along road k. Describe the length of the portion of each road that belongs to the intersection as an interval [α k , β k ] ⊂ R , and define a safety distance γ ∈ R + , common to all vehicles. We say that two vehicles i ∈ Π k , j ∈ Π l with k = l undergo a collision whenever x i ∈ [α k , β k ] and x j ∈ [α l , β l ] simultaneously. Similarly, we say that two vehicles i, j ∈ Π k undergo a collision whenever |x i −x j | < γ. The subset of X of all collision points is called the bad set B. A trajectory x(t) of (1) is -safe provided inf t≥0,b∈B
Let X/ denote the quotient set of X by the equivalence classes induced by . We aim to design a supervisor σ : X/ → 2 Vc for (1) that enforces 0-safety, where V c = U c /τ . More precisely, we aim to solve the following problem.
Problem II.1. Given X/ , define a supervisor that associates to each x(kτ ) ∈ X a set of inputs v c ∈ V c allowed for the interval [kτ, (k + 1)τ ] and constant over this time interval, with the following properties:
is 0-safe in the same time interval (0-safety)
By reducing (2) to a finite abstraction, we can reduce Problem II.1 to the problem of selecting a particular set T of executions ofG. Given such a set T , construct a supervisor map for each time interval [kτ, (k + 1)τ ] as follows
Intuitively, we would like T to be selected as the set of executions that should be allowed by the system in order to preclude only unsafe behavior.
The non-escaping property implies that the presence or absence of an execution from T should depend only on the controllable events u c . Otherwise, the supervisor σ T could potentially allow executions that are not in the set T , due to uncontrollable events u uc or w. This property is the analogue of the controllability property of DES [15] .
We introduce the following definitions of safety forG.
, where µ = {µ, . . . , µ} ∈ R n and the inequalities are taken component-wise. An execution (q, s) is ( 1 , 2 )-safe if all the transitions that compose it are ( 1 , 2 )-safe.
The above definition captures the idea that the interpolated trajectory from q to q (given by q + t(q − q)/τ ) must be a certain (potentially time-dependent) distance away from any point in the bad set. Let and be defined as follows:
where
We have shown that for these definitions of and (which depend on q, u, and w), ( , )-safety of a transition implies 0-safety of the corresponding trajectory x(kτ + t) for t ∈ [0, τ ] when (x(kτ )) = q, DE control decision u c is issued at time kτ , the uncontrolled vehicles take action u uc , and the disturbance is w.
Lemma II.2. If T is a set of suffix-closed and ( , )-safe executions, and is non-escaping, then σ T in (6) enforces 0-safety.
Then, let us define forward-maximal executions as follows. This definition ensures that we allow only executions that eventually reach some goal (e.g., crossing the intersection). By this definition and the fact that (2) alternatingly simulatesG, we can prove the next result.
Lemma II.3. If T is a set of forward-maximal executions, suffix-closed and non-escaping, then σ T in (6) is non-blocking.
From the above results, we can conclude that
Theorem II.4. If T is selected as the largest set of ( , )-safe, suffix-closed, non-escaping and forward-maximal executions of (4), then the supervisor (6) solves Problem II.1.
Proof: 0-safety and nonblockingness follow from Lemmas II.2 and II.3 and maximal permissiveness is ensured by taking T as the largest set satisfying all required conditions.
In the following sections, we present an algorithm to construct T in order to enforce safety in the case of unmodeled dynamics and in the presence of uncontrolled vehicles. Specifically, we propose an algorithm to construct sets of executions T to solve the three following problems:
Problem II.2. Determine the largest set T of ( , )-safe suffixclosed, non-escaping and forward-maximal executions when d min = d max = 0 and vehicles k + 1, ..., n are uncontrolled. Problem II.3. Determine the largest set T of ( , )-safe suffixclosed, non-escaping and forward-maximal executions when d min , d max = 0 and all vehicles are controlled.
Problem II.4. Determine the largest set T of ( , )-safe suffixclosed, non-escaping and forward-maximal executions when d min , d max = 0 and vehicles k + 1, ..., n are uncontrolled.
III. DISCRETE EVENT SYSTEM PROBLEM FORMULATION
By fixing the initial state of the automaton to be q ∈ Q 0 , the resulting language, denoted by L(G, q), is in a one-toone relation with the set of all possible executions (q, s), that have q as initial condition 1 . In order to simulate multiple possible initial states, we introduce a "dummy" state with no physical meaning, denoted by q 0 , and for each q ∈ Q 0 , we create a transition with label e q from q 0 to q. We denote by E Q the set of all such events e q : E Q = {e q : q ∈ Q 0 }. Mathematically, we define the transition function ψ acting on state q 0 by ψ(q 0 , e q ) = q for any e q ∈ E Q . To represent the states reached by (4) when a transition leavesQ, we define the set of marked (in standard DES terminology) states Q m
The set Q m satisfiesQ ∩ Q m = ∅ and allows us to translate Definition II.6 into a non-blocking condition on the DES. Intuitively, a forward-maximal execution is an execution that extends forward in time as much as possible inQ. By definition of Q m it is clear that ψ(q, s) ∈ Q m whenever ψ(q, s) is forward-maximal. As previously stated, we write U = U c × U uc , where U c consists of the discrete-event (DE) controlled input and U uc consists of the DE uncontrolled input. Events in the set U c correspond to controllable events and events in the sets U uc or W correspond to uncontrollable events. Since each event must take us to a new state, we define sets of intermediate states Q I1 and Q I2 along with intermediate transition functions
. With these additions, we redefine G as the complete DES
Note that G has a single initial state, the dummy state q 0 . Note also that the set of events E Q are considered controllable. Finally, note that Q I1 and Q I2 are disjoint fromQ. This is done in order to enforce the strict alternation of controllable and uncontrollable events. Mathematically, the language L(G) ⊆ E Q (U c U uc W )
* . The first step in computing the desired set T is finding the setT of all executions (not necessarily forward-maximal) that are ( , )-safe executions of system (13) . FromT , we obtain the language L a , called the safety specification, by mapping executions to strings (an execution (q, s) maps to the string e q s and vice-versa). Note that L a ⊆ L(G) and is prefix-closed. Next, we define the set L am of marked strings as the subset of L a corresponding to forward-maximal executions. From the way we have defined Q m , we see that L am = L a ∩L m (G). As seen above, dealing with problems II.2, II.3 and II.4 results in the introduction of uncontrollable events. This means that it is possible for there to exist some pair of strings s 1 and s 2 such that s 1 ∈ L a and s 2 = s 1 e / ∈ L a , for some uncontrollable event e ∈ U uc or e ∈ W . This is called a control conflict since we wish to allow s 1 but allowing it makes it impossible to prevent s 2 , which we do not wish to allow. The solution to this problem is to "shrink" the language to the largest possible subset that has no control conflicts. This problem always has a unique solution, which is called the supremal controllable sublanguage and is denoted by the operation ↑ C on languages [15] . The safety specification in our problem is completely expressible in terms of safe states and/or safe transitions over G at the discrete event level. Therefore, L a and L am are generated and marked, respectively, by a subautomaton of G. In this case, without loss of generality, we can define the domain of the DE supervisor to be the state set of G, Q, instead of the domain L(G) used in the development of the results in supervisory control theory. Since we also require the solution to be non-blocking, we have to solve at the discrete event level the basic supervisory control problem in the nonblocking case (BSCP-NB), as defined in [15] :
Problem III.1. Given system G with event set E, uncontrollable event set E uc ⊆ E, and admissible marked language L am ⊆ L m (G), find a non-blocking DE-supervisor S : Q → 2 U (that chooses which events to allow in each state) such that:
is "the largest it can be", that is, for any other non-blocking DE-supervisor S other such that
In the above, L(S/G) is defined to be the set of strings s ∈ L(G) that are allowed by the DE-supervisor S and L m (S/G) is the subset of those strings that are marked. A unique solution exists when [15] . This is always the case when
Finally, the set T consist of those executions that correspond to strings in L ↑C am . The ( , )-safety of T can be ensured by properly defining safety of the transitions of G and its suffixclosure is guaranteed by the structure of languages. Nonescapingness of T is ensured by the fact that L ↑C am will be free of control conflicts and forward-maximality is ensured by the non-blocking property of L ↑C am . Finally, T is the largest set satisfying the above properties because L ↑C am is the supremal controllable sublanguage of L am . The supervisor σ can be computed from S as follows:
IV. CONTROL OF THE DISCRETE EVENT SYSTEM
In principle, the solution to BSCP-NB can be computed using the standard iterative algorithm for computing L ↑C am , or the linear-time version that applies to livelock-free systems (DES G is livelock-free if every cycle in G contains a marked state), such as the one in [16] . We chose to develop our own customized algorithm because the special structure of our problem allows us to do even better in the presence of a disturbance or of uncontrollable vehicles. Specifically, it can be shown that, to verify the safety of DE control decision u c from DE state q, we do not need to check safety of every transition of the form (q, ψ(q, u c , u uc , w) ). Instead, we can use a single test with a running time of O(n 2 ) by computing the set of positions which the vehicles could be in at time t ∈ [kτ, (k + 1)τ ] when DE control decision u c is made from DE state q at time kτ . In this section, we provide theorems that establish the basis for our algorithmic solutions.
Definition IV.1. The set of reachable states from state q given DE control decision u c is defined by R(q, u c ) :
Definition IV.2. Given t ∈ [0, τ ], let the set A q,u,w (t) ⊆ X denote the set of points x d such that it is possible for x(kτ + t) = x d when (x(kτ )) = q, DE control decision u c is issued at time kτ , the uncontrolled vehicles take action u uc , and the disturbance is w.
From the above definition, we can see that a transition from q to q is 0-safe in the continuous domain if A q,u,w (t) does not cross the bad set for t ∈ [0, τ ].
Definition IV.3. Given t ∈ [0, τ ], let the set A q,uc (t) ⊆ X denote the set of points x d such that it is possible for x(kτ + t) = x d when (x(kτ )) = q and DE control decision u c is issued at time kτ .
Clearly, A q,uc (t) = (q − µτ /2 + v uc t, q + µτ /2 + v uc t], where v uc and v uc are as given in equations (11) and (12) for the controlled vehicles and are equal to v min + d min and v max +d max , respectively, for the uncontrolled vehicles. Thus, A q,uc (t) is the analogue of A q,u,w (t) when we do not fix u uc and w. By the above two definitions, it must be that A q,uc (t) = uuc∈Uuc w∈W A q,u,w (t). The set A q,u,w (t) has a non-trivial shape and it is not simple to check whether it crosses the bad set. Also of importance is the fact that A q,u,w (t) does indeed have a dependence on u so that the safety of an individual transition is not uniquely determined by its start and end state. Instead, we can determine if DE control decision u c is safe from DE state q by checking if the set A q,uc (t) crosses the bad set for some t ∈ [0, τ ], which can be done in O(n 2 ) time. The idea is to verify intersection for each pair of vehicles, since the bad set reduces to a rectangle in this case. Thus, rather than determining the safety of each of the |U uc ||W | transitions that could result from DE control decision u c ∈ U c , it suffices to make a single safety test for each control decision. Hence we make |U c | safety tests instead of |U c ||U uc ||W | safety tests.
Theorem IV.1 (Basis for Depth-First Search). Let S be the minimally restrictive non-blocking DE-supervisor. Then S must satisfy the following, for all q ∈ Q, q = q 0 :
where SafeDECon(G, q, u c ) is true if and only if the set A q,uc (t) does not cross the bad set for any t ∈ [0, τ ].
The above theorem suggests that computing the set S(q) for some q ∈ Q can be done by checking, for each u c ∈ U c , whether taking DE control decision u c from DE state q could result in the bad set being crossed during the following interval of time τ and, for each q ∈ R(q, u c ), whether q is either terminal or non-deadlocked. Since checking whether q is nondeadlocked requires determining whether S(q ) = ∅, this can be accomplished through recursion. This forms the basis for the use of depth-first seach to compute the DE-supervisor S.
A. The algorithm
Algorithm 1 shows pseudo-code for the algorithm which computes the DE-supervisor S defined in Section III and hence solves each of the four problems of Section II. The subroutine "Terminal(G, q)" checks if all the vehicles have crossed the finish line (if q ∈ Q m ). The variable "Done(q)" is true if and only if the algorithm has already been called with position q. The variable Safe(q) is true if q was determined to be safe, which means that S(q) = ∅. The variable Safe(q) is valid only if Done(q) is true. Finally, the subroutine SafeDECon(G, q, u c )" checks if the set A q,uc (t) does not cross the bad set for any t ∈ [0, τ ].
Although the pseudo-code for the solution to all problems is the same, each of the four problems will result in different ways of computing the set R(q, u c ) and therefore each problem will have small differences in implementation of the algorithm. The call to DoDFS(G, q) computes the set S(q) and returns true if and only if q ∈ Q m ∨ S(q) = ∅. It is thus readily observed that lines 9-20 of the algorithm implement equation (15) and hence correctly computes S. The running time is dependent on the size of the set R(q, u c ) and is given by the expression O(|Q||U c |n 2 + |Q||U c ||R(q, u c )|). The values for each of the four cases are given in Table I . In the last case, k is the number of controlled vehicles, and
TABLE I RUNNING TIMES IN EACH OF THE FOUR PROBLEM SCENARIOS
The standard algorithm for computing the supremal controllable sublanguage works by first constructing an automaton H representing the legal language specification and taking the product G × H, then performing an iterative procedure until convergence, which runs in time quadratic in the size of G×H. Let X G and X H be the state spaces of G and H, respectively, and E be the set of events. Recalling that verifying safety of a transition takes time O(n 2 ), the asymptotic running time will therefore be O(|X G ||E|n 2 ) to construct H (step 1), and O(|X G | 2 |X H | 2 |E|) for the iterative process (step 2). Algorithm 1 achieves better asymptotic complexity in three ways. First, as previously mentioned, we can use a linear time algorithm since our system is livelock-free. Second, because our legal language specification is represented by a sub-automaton of G at the outset (rather than merely being a sublanguage of L(G)), the product automaton G × H is isomorphic to H. The running time of step 2 is therefore O(|X H ||E|). return Safe(q) 6: end if
Safe(q) ← false 8:
for all u c ∈ U c do 10: if not SafeDECon(G, q, u c ) then
11:
S(q) ← S(q) \ {u c }
12:
continue 13: end if 14: for all q ∈ R(q, u c ) do 15: if not DoDFS(G, q ) then return Safe(q) 26: end procedure V. PERFORMANCE OF THE ALGORITHM We have implemented the algorithm presented above as an interactive Java application. Sample trajectories are shown in the three panels of Figure 1 . In all cases, we took µ = τ = 1. n . The number of states and DE control decisions were |Q| ≈ 6.83 × 10 4 and |U | = 32, and it took 0.034 seconds to compute the solution. All simulations were run on a 1.6GHz laptop computer and used under 300MB of memory. 
VI. CONCLUSION
We have considered the problem of collision avoidance in vehicular networks as a supervisory control problem for a discrete event abstraction of the underlying continuous dynamics modeled by a first order system with model uncertainty. We have demonstrated that our abstraction methodology guarantees that the supervisor designed at the discrete event level, when lifted to the continuous level, satisfies the desired safety property, i.e., collisions are avoided. By considering the effect of unmodeled dynamics and uncontrolled vehicles as uncontrollable events at the discrete event level, we have been able to leverage the concepts and techniques of the theory of supervisory control of DES, in particular the nonblockingness and maximal permissiveness properties of the supremal controllable sublanguage of the marked version of the safe language. Moreover, we have exploited the structural properties of the transition structure of the discrete event model obtained by abstraction and developed a new algorithm for computing the supremal controllable sublanguage customized to this particular application, which achieves greater efficiency than the standard one. This work constitutes a new application area of DES theory, beyond those in manufacturing and software for instance (see, e.g., [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] ), with the distinctive feature that the DES model is obtained by abstraction from a continuous one, not by direct modeling of the discrete transition structure. Current issues of interest include refinement of our methodology to handle continuous models with second order dynamics, imperfect state information, acceleration constraints, and further algorithmic improvements.
